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Transformations of the Officer Corps in Hungary 
(1900-1940) 
Tibor Hajdu ∗ 
Abstract: After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich) a new national 
– Honved – army was set up, but four fifth of the conscripts from Hungary as 
well as half of the Hungarian officers were actually drafted in the k.u. k (royal 
and imperial) ‘common Army’ of the Habsburg Monarchy. There remained 
only 6 % – later 8 % – Hungarians in the ‘common’ k. u. k. officer corps. In 
the 1870 half of these Hungarian officers and even in the 1900s some 40 % 
were still noblemen. The Honved officer corps of the 1870s was a strange mix-
ture. The elderly veterans of the 1848 revolution and war of independence 
were mostly noblemen. On the contrary, there was a number of peasant boys 
and others of humble social background among the younger subalterns, since 
the Honved army did not appear as distinguished enough socially for the ‘better 
families’. Later these differences tended to disappear and by the early 20th 
century the Honved officer corps was considered of quite similar social and 
military standing as its k.u.k equivalent.– Following the collapse of the Monar-
chy in 1918, the earlier members of the Honved prevailed in the new army of 
the rump state, because the royalist officers of the Habsburg Empire refused to 
serve under admiral Horthy considered as a ‘traitor’. The new officer corps had 
thus much less noblemen and only a few real aristocrats, but – besides officers’ 
sons – there were more and more sons of civil servants, railway and post offi-
cials as well as other members of the ‘non economic’ lower middle classes. 
 
Up to the Ausgleich in 1867 a Hungarian Army or a Hungarian Officer Corps 
did not exist. Hungarian officers could serve as members of the Habsburg 
Army, Hungarian regiments were integrated in the same Army. The Ausgleich 
and the following military reforms of the late sixties led to a controversial and 
temporary but lasting solution, so characteristic for most institutions of the 
Dual Habsburg Monarchy. Legally one fifth, practically even less of the Hun-
garian conscripts were summoned up to the newly constructed Hungarian 
“Honvéd” Army, the majority of Hungarian soldiers and officers remained with 
the Common, Kaiserlich-Königlich Army. However, Hungarians were very 
proud with their little and second-line Honvéd Army, while Austrian Generals 
were hurt and alarmed even with such rather poor national progress. 
Francis Joseph stuck to the inseparability of his beloved generality what 
caused the first military scandal of many. The first Hungarian Premier, An-
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drássy had planned the regulations of Honvéd with the help of some out-
standing Generals of the 1848 War of Independence, as George Klapka, Anton 
Vetter or Maurice Perczel and also would nominate them among the first Hon-
véd Generals, Klapka even for Minister of Defence. Also they would be mem-
bers of the united k. k. Generality. The Austrian generals, however, would not 
hear of Klapka, Friedrich Prinz von Liechtenstein, commander of all troops in 
Hungary, announced that he would retire if “the traitor” were appointed to any 
rank. 
As a result Premier Andrássy kept the Ministry of Defence for himself, the 
veteran revolutionary officers could have been appointed to Honvéd officer 
corps only up to Colonel. True, some of these Colonels were later promoted by 
the Emperor to Generals, but that was by Kakanian reasoning quite different. 
For the time being, under Andrássy the Hungarian national Army had only two 
generals: for commander-in-chief Archduke Joseph and Eduard von Gräf, a 
kaisertreu Transylvanian German, a feared gendarme officer before the Aus-
gleich. Of active colonels, 7 were from the revolutionary army of 1848 and 4 
transferred from the k.k. army. Of 14 lieutenant colonels, 11 were revolution-
ary veterans, as were 42 of the 71 majors. Of 88 captains First class, 35 were 
revolutionary vets, while 39 came from the Habsburg army and 14 from the 
retired list of the latter. Similarly, of 29 captains 2-d class, 18 were vets, of 176 
first lieutenants, 65 and of 189 sublieutenants, 56. 
Also, the Honvéd officer corps contained officers who had once fought 
against each other, no rarity in Hungarian history. Several of the colonels, for 
example János Máriássy, János Horváth or Eduard Czillich spent six or seven 
years in heavy chains in Olmütz prison or elsewhere. The adjutant of the Minis-
ter, major Count Schweinitz had served the Kaiser in 1849 as a young lieuten-
ant and guarded the imprisoned freedom fighters in the Arad fortress, notably 
being very human to the prisoners. As officer of the occupation army married a 
Hungarian girl and became a German-speaking Hungarian patriot. The adjutant 
of Erzherzog Joseph, László Graf Vay, was captain of the revolutionary army 
who after the Revolution followed Kossuth to Turkey.  
Through the seventies, only half of the senior Honvéd officers were of Hun-
garian nationality, no more as one tenth Croats or Serbians, the others Ger-
mans. In the eighties under the new Minister of Defence, the favourite of the 
Emperor, General Fejérváry, an obvious change occurred: the majority of the 
revolutionary vets were pensioned, the number of young Hungarian officers 
was growing but not yet at the command posts. 
As many Hungarian k.k. officers were transferred to the Honvéd, in the k.k. 
officer corps remained even less Hungarian as were before. 1866 7% of the 
generals and 6% of the colonels on active service were of Hungarian national-
ity, junior officers even less. Only in the last years of the 19th century reached 
the number of Hungarian officers in the k.u.k. army the 8%. In spite of this low 
percent, the joint, k.k. army had more officers of Hungarian nationality, than 
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the Honvéd, struggling for a long time with a lack of commissioned officers. At 
these years according to the official military statistics about 78% of the career 
k.k. officers were Germans; by my calculations something less as 70%, but 
even so, even in the Hungarian regiments the majority of the officers, much 
more of the senior officers, strikingly more of the Regiment Commanders were 
Germans. 
As for the questionable statistics I don’t mean forced Germanisation in the 
Army. The problem refers to the fact that the majority of German officers came 
from Hungary, Bohemia and other non-German lands of the Empire. (The less 
German officers were born in the lands of today’s Oesterreich except Wien and 
Nieder-Österreich. Besides, many military historians are sharing the misbelief, 
as if before Königgraetz a great part of Habsburg officers were coming from 
non-Habsburg German lands. What is true only for the high leadership, for 
example Beck or Edelsheim, but not for the whole officer corps.) I came at the 
results that about 28% of the k.u.k. officers were born in Hungary, from them a 
good third were Germans what means some 15% of the German officers came 
from Hungary and even more from Bohemia. because there were families of 
mixed nationality or freshly assimilated – therefore many officers of rather 
Bohemian, Moravian, Hungarian or perhaps Slovenian nationality, or belong-
ing to mixed families, reported himself for Germans. 
In the Honvéd army, on the contrary, nationality would counted another 
way. Studying registrations of the Honvéd Ludovika Academy we learn that 
there were only two nationalities: Hungarians and Croats, as the Honvéd army 
was containing Hungarian and Croat regiments. Looking closer at the names, 
father’s name, birth place, religion, language knowledge etc. we may assume 
about 15% the Honvéd officers were Germans but those who were born in 
Hungary counted for Hungarians, and only those born out of Hungary and 
transferred from the k.k. army (1%) were recognised as German nationals. .The 
Serbian officers, 2% of the Honvéd officer corps, had free choice to be regis-
tered for Hungarians or Croats. 
Looking at the Honvéd officer corps from another point of view, in the be-
ginning young men mostly preferred the shining k.k. regiments against the 
poorly equipped new Honvéd. There was a lack of subaltern officers for 20-25 
years and therefore were accepted cadets of humble origin or even Jews. In our 
days we would call such system democratic but it was only lack of aspirants. In 
the academic year 1879-1880 of the 141 cadets, entering the Ludovika only 27 
had had a full high-school education. When a recruit seemed fit enough he was 
sent to the Ludovika Academy as Samuel Kohn in 1873, who as a young lieu-
tenant had been christened, changed his family name to the patriotic Hazai and 
at the outbreak of First World War soon General and Minister of Defence. But 
under General Hazai Jewish or peasant boys since a long time did not had 
access to the Ludovika. The first big peasant politicians, István “Nagyatádi” 
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Szabó and András Áchim both serving for three years could have been no more 
as non-coms having no high school report. 
Prior to the 1848 revolutions the Habsburg officer corps was a noble one. 
Not less as a half of the Hungarian officers were noblemen and the others as-
pired for ennoblement which they mostly gained when reached higher ranks. In 
1866 60% of the generals held aristocratic titles. After Königgrätz their number 
diminished, but even in 1889 no less as 42%, in 1897 24%. The Hungarian 
aristocracy too withdraw from the active service, like the Germans. Before 
First World War, in 1913 there remained 59 aristocrats that is 16% of the active 
generals, from the 59, Hungarians are only 7 and most of them at the Honvéd. 
As for the Hungarian officers, in the k.k. army as early as in the seventies 
about the half of them were noblemen, even in the first years of the 20th cen-
tury nearly 40%. One of the reasons of that, beside the semi-feudal state of 
Hungarian society through the 19th century is the different social status of the 
various service branches. Cavalry officers were at the top and about half of the 
Hungarian officers in the k.k. army were cavalrists, especially hussars. In 1897 
62,5% of the cavalry officers were noblemen. Even there were differences, 
German aristocrats preferred the 7th and 13th dragoons, Hungarian aristocrats 
and other “grand families” the 7th and 12th hussars, where ¾ of the officers 
were noblemen. To these aristocratic regiments only such reserve officers were 
let whose social position corresponded with the commissioned ones, brothers 
or nephews frequently volunteered for reserve officers to the regiment where 
they relatives served.  
After the cavalry came only the general staff the Feldjäger (I don’t know 
who to translate it to English), and some “mounted” artillery regiments. Ac-
cording to the well known statistics of Captain Kandelsdorfer, in 1897 37% of 
the staff officers, 24% of the Feldjägers, 22% of military engineers, 16% of the 
artillery officers, 145 of the Fusiliers and only 6% of the Train and Sanitary 
officers were nobles. But there were great differences even among Fusilier 
regiments. In 7 such regiments 25 to 33% amounted the noble officers, from 
the seven 4 were Hungarian regiments, namely the 46 (Szeged) regiment with 
30%, the No 34 (Kassa) with 29%, the No 60 
The Honvéd officer corps of the seventies was a strange mixture: as the 
revolutionary vets were mostly noblemen, in the higher ranks from major on 
served 12% aristocrats and 44% other titled noblemen; on the contrary, among 
the young subalterns much more peasant boys and others of humble origin as in 
the k.k. officer corps. Later these extremities diminished: the old aristocrats 
retired and from the late eighties the young officers were picked from the mid-
dle class or officer families.  
For my calculations, to the end of the 19th Century no less as 25% of the 
Honvéd officers had civil servant fathers, not counting some 8% teachers, 
professors, railway- and postmen. From officer’s and military official’s fami-
lies came not so many, as in the k.u.k. army but no less than 12%. Also almost 
 218
the half of them were from school graduated middle class fathers, belonging to 
the state. 
There were less middle class fathers active in business, free professions etc., 
about 16%. 8% were gentlemen landowners, relatively much agricultural offi-
cials and foresters, above 9%. Very few capitalists, big house-owners. Artisans, 
shopkeepers, innkeepers and similar “Kleinbürger” about 10%. About 5% were 
peasant boys, from proletarian families only 1% or less. Counting Ludovika 
cadets by school years, the general proportions are similar, but sons of gentle-
men landowners were reported less from year to year, but one the contrary, 
more and more came from civil servant, teacher, railway and post official fami-
lies. Peasant boys number to the pre-war years diminished to 2% and they also 
mostly from poor Szekler, also Transylvanian Grenzer. In the first years came 
less from officers’ families as in the whole officer corps, but before the war 
they had reach the average proportion. 
In the first years of the 20th century Honvéd officer corps both socially and 
for military level closed up to the k.u.k. officer corps. The Croat regiments 
were slightly different. Croat aristocracy and higher officer’s sons were striving 
for the k.u.k. army, for the Honvéd (Domobran in Croat) remained the simpler 
“Grenzersöhne”, graniĉar’s. As for k.u.k. officers of Hungarian nationality, 
they are a little – but not much – better situated as the Honvéd officers, espe-
cially in the early years, but the great difference is, there were much more 
“Offiziersöhne”, near to 20%. (By the non-Hungarian officers about 26%.) 
Before First War about 40 Hungarian generals served in both armies. 8% of 
their fathers were aristocrats, 35% other noblemen. About one sixth of fathers 
were officers, another one sixth from the free professions.  
After the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy the little but independent 
Hungary had to build up an independent army. Interestingly in the new officer 
corps, even in higher ranks, prevailed the Honvéd’s. This phenomenon had 
many reasons, one of them. the comradely or cliquish holding together, the 
brotherhood of Ludovika graduates. Another reason the withdrawal of aristo-
cratic or well-to-do nobility (“bene possessionati” called in Hungary), partly 
because of general decay, decadence, partly because after the unsuccessful 
attempts of Charles, the last king (or emperor) to regain the Hungarian crown, 
many royalist higher officers left the army of the “traitor” Horthy. 
Many good reserve officers of mixed origin were activated during or after 
the war, especially political followers of Horthy. After the war the middle class 
disintegrated itself: the mostly gentry office-holding or meritocratic part of it 
kept a distance against the partly Jewish bourgeois middle-class. The latter 
were gradually pushed out of civil services, first of all of officer corps. Before 
the war on the base of their high school grades one quarter of Hungarian re-
serve officers had been Jewish, their number in the twenties was extremely 
minimized. On the other hand the gentry officer corps were being filled up 
gradually with sons of non-coms, lower officials and even office servants (I 
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don’t mean civil servants). It is disputed, whether is that phenomenon to be 
called a democratisation or rather something other. It could be if among the 
young officers would be growing significantly the number of peasant’s and 
workmen’s sons but it was not the case. 
We don’t have yet a general study on the social background of the whole of-
ficer corps of the Horthy era, but we can depend on the very detailed research 
of Sándor Szakály on the military elite. He studied the data of 412 leading 
officers, mainly generals and some colonels in key positions during second 
world war. Only 1,3% of them came from a worker’s and 3,8% from a peas-
ant’s family. On the other side, only 1% of them were aristocrats but even from 
these no one of the old, exclusive families may we see among them. Lesser 
nobles were enough from the officer’s families. The fathers of 14,6% were 
army officers. The great majority middle class. However, inside of the middle 
classes only about 20% had artisan, merchant, shopkeeper or business official 
father. That is, of all the business world came only one fourth of the military 
elite. Another quarter of the fathers were civil servants, without teachers, rail-
way and post officials. From the latter occupations – Post and Railways – came 
some 12,6%, a striking number, because their ethos and subordination were the 
closest to the military. Teachers or professors 11%. To the free professions, as 
advocates, medical doctors etc, also engineers, belonged less as ten percent.  
From the above and other sources we may come to the conclusion that the 
officer corps both for social position and mentality changed very much after 
First World War. Some of my colleagues are of the meaning, the after-war 
officer corps turned more open as before. I’d say yes, but only in clearly fixed 
directions. For another aspects it remained closed or closed up more as before 
the war. During 19th century well-to-do officers were preferred, especially at 
cavalry, staff corps and at nomination for regiment commandant. This aspect 
lost of importance and also belonging to the nobility. They were not so choosy 
for origin and wealth of the bride, except perhaps of military attaché’s, result-
ing in growing number of married officers. 
As for the nobility occurred a new problem: army was always one of the 
best channels for ennoblement. Horthy as Regent hadn’t the right to make 
nobles therefore among younger officers were much less nobles. Horthy 
founded a strange substitution, the so-called Vitézi Rend, a sort of Order. To 
become a Vitéz (hard to translate, more as brave, less as hero, coming from the 
slavic витязь) one had to have strictly defined war decorations and front ser-
vice. It was open for non-coms too, but not for Jews, socialists, freemasons and 
similar unpatriotic persons. The vitéz peasant non-coms could even gain by the 
land reform a “family farm”. A vitéz had to be preferred by obtaining a status 
in civil or military services. In spite of that many well decorated officers didn’t 
ask for it, obviously considering ridiculous. 
As for nationality, in the army of Horthy there was no such differentiation. 
A Hungarian officer had to be Hungarian. Many enough were of German ori-
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gin, for whom was enough to change the German family for a gentry-like Hun-
garian – for Knausz vitéz Szombathelyi, for Gröller vitéz Kisfaludy and so on 
(also some Grenzersöhne as the Hungarian Quisling, vitéz Sztójay-Stojakovits. 
It is a much debated question whether had the national origin of many generals 
some significance in Hungary’s place in second World War?  
As for my opinion one oughtn’t be judged politically as an individual by his 
origin as for a long time used to be in Hungary, but on the contrary a vain at-
tempt to deny practical importance of prevalence German connections, general 
knowledge of German language contrary to weak knowledge of western lan-
guages and the “enemy” states. One half of the military elite were born in 
towns or villages broken off from Hungary by Paris peace treaty; here no 
comment may seeming necessary. 
After First World War a big change occurred in the social position of officer 
corps. Before the war the strange partition of Hungarian armed forces and the 
tensions between Wien and Budapest had made unlikely for it to have impor-
tant role in Hungarian politics. There were exceptions: Defence Minister Fe-
jérváry from about 1894 and 1906 was an important personality in Hungarian 
politics, some retired officers went to parliament, but generally in liberal Hun-
gary army and politics were little connected. Horthy created a militaristic re-
gime, career officers were made cabinet members, even Premiers, nothing to 
say of other civilian posts. The army took part in boys education (Levente, boy-
scouts) and during Second World War took over important state functions. 
Some characteristics of the officer corps remained unchanged. Except formali-
ties, the organisation of Ludovika Academy, cadet schools and military high 
schools, important was that unlike other modernised armies as the German or 
the Soviet in Hungary for the best soldiers or non-coms remained impossible to 
be commissioned officers, obsolete 19th Century barriers between officers and 
soldiers remained unmoved. 
Trying to compare Horthy’s army elite with that of Francis Joseph one can 
say the tendency striving from the supranational, discrepant organisation of the 
Dual Monarchy to a nationalistic army, with a non-aristocratic middle-class 
officer corps had both its good and bad sides. Uniformity is useful for an army, 
ignorance of non-military values may be practical. With the aristocratic officers 
vanished amateurism but chivalry too. During the war officers frequently per-
petrated things once unthinkable for them who were wearing the coat of Fran-
cis Joseph. To abandon the meritocratic system of choosing reserve officers’, 
by which any book-keeper with a high-school report but without any knowl-
edge of peasant lads could be an army officer, could make the officer corps 
more consistent. Getting rid off with other-thinking intellectuals might be good 
for begin a war but catastrophic at the end; the officers’ average level could 
improved but in this military elite wasn’t present a Prinz Eugen and perhaps 
couldn’t be. 
